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BANK CONTROL AND THE NUMBER OF BANK 





We explore the determinants of the number of long-term bank relations of listed Japanese 
firms using a unique data set covering the period 1982-1999. Japanese listed firms have about 
seven long-term bank loan relations on average, but show a large variation around the 
average. We analyze the determinants of the choice for the number of bank relations. We use 
data on loan and equity ownership to address the impact of the Japan-specific bank-firm 
relations and bank control on the number of loans decision. Having a relation with a top-
equity holding bank reduces the number of bank relations, while debt-rich and cash-poor 
firms have more bank relations. 
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We analyze the choice of the number of long-term banking relations of Japanese 
listed firms in the period 1982-1999. Firm-bank relations are in the core of Japanese 
economic development in the post-war period and it is widely believed that long-term 
loans were essential to enhance the rapid Japanese economic growth in the 1960s and 
1970s. As known, in post-war Japan long-term bank loans were the number one source of 
external funds for almost all firms (see Fukuda, 2001). Except for a few cash-rich firms 
internal financing was limited in general. As Ito (1992) shows, internal financing in the 
1960s and 1970s was only about 20% of the total corporate financial needs (as compared 
to 50% for the U.S.). The dominant role of long-term loans in external finance is reflected 
in the fact that until the mid-1980s bond financing was strictly regulated (even after 1985 
only very large firms were able to issue bonds).  
It should be noted that the large banks were key players in the Japanese industrial 
group structure called keiretsu, wherein lending activity, combined with equity ownership, 
is relatively important (see e.g. Flath, 1993). In the keiretsu structure firms have a strong 
and long-lasting relation with the bank in the group, called the main bank.  It is true that 
the main bank plays a dominant role in providing loans to the affiliated firms, but the 
firms  nonetheless  borrow  from  banks  outside  the  group.  We  investigate  why  firms 
depend on other banks besides their main bank and what determines the optimal number 
of creditors in the presence of main banks.  
It is often argued that the bank-firm relationship changed in the course of bubble- 
and post-bubble period. There are several factors that explain this change. First, financial 
deregulation allowed firms to issue public debt, which made firms less reliant on bank 
loans. Secondly, banks are burdened with heavy non-performing loans after the bubble 
burst, which hindered the intermediary role of banks. So it is still an interesting question 
how the change of bank-firm relationship affected the optimal number of creditors.  The 
rather unique feature of our data enables us to answer this question empirically. Our data 
set  contains  the  time-series  information  for  long-term  loans  for  the  years  1982-1999.  
This period covers the bubble and the post-bubble years. How does the bad loan problem 
affect individual firm decisions to contract banks? We illustrate this in Figure 1 that gives 
the percentage of single-bank relations of 14055 firm-year observations for the  years   2 
1982-1999. The percentage of single-bank to all relations is at most 13% and Japanese 
firms do have multiple banking contacts on average. Figure 1 also suggests that during 
the bubble period firms tended to rely on a single relation, while in the period of long 
stagnation after the bubble burst the average percentage of multiple contracts increased. 
This finding stresses the need for further analysis. 
 
Our  study  based  on  the  unique  data  set  has  advantage  over  the  past  studies. 
Contrary to earlier ´static survey´ studies on the optimal number of bank relationships 
(see e.g. Detragiache et al., 2000, Degryse and Ongena, 2001, and Houston and James, 
2001)  we  exploit,  like  Farinha  and  Santos  (2004)  and  Foglia  et  al.  (1998),  the  time 
variation in our extensive data set. Farinha and Santos, though, focus on the timing of 
switching from one to multiple bank relations for especially young firms and Foglia et al. 
on the effects of the borrowing structure on the thoroughness of the banking system’s 
overall monitoring of individual borrower firms. The scope of our paper is broader as we 
have a  general interest  in multiple relations of large listed Japanese  firms, for which 
control  of  ownership  matters.  We  include  information  with  respect  to  the  Japanese 
corporate  (bank)  control  mechanism  using  variables  that  define  top  loan  and  equity 
ownership on the firm level. This feature is especially relevant to the keiretsu structures. 




















































































%  3 
We proceed as follows. First we give a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the determination of the optimal number of bank relations. The theoretical 
background of our paper is a key problem in financial economics: what is the optimal 
number of creditors? These creditors can be holders of either public or private claims. We 
analyze  the  private  component,  namely  the  number  of  bank  contracts  per  firm.  This 
literature is largely based on the theory of corporate finance. In this literature one is 
interested in the game between the provider of capital and the firm regarding the control 
rights that belong to the assets. This game can cover the choice between equity and debt, 
the rights of equity holders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), or the composition of external 
financing (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). We review the relevant literature and select the 
variables that might influence the choice of the number of bank contacts. We pay special 
attention to the literature that relates the theory of the optimal number of bank contacts 
and the role of main banks. Next we describe the data we use. The data are provided by 
the Development Bank of Japan and form a rather rich set of detailed balance sheet and 
profit-loss account data as well as indicators of ownership of both (long-term) loans and 
equity. We give an extensive descriptive overview of the variables of interest in Section 3. 
In Section 4 we present an econometric analysis of the decision to borrow from different 
banks. Since our main dependent variable, the number of bank relations, is a discrete 
variable we estimate several discrete choice models. Moreover, we present results for the 
explanation of the loan concentration ratio (measured by the Herfindahl index).  We find 
that size, profitability, solvability, liquidity, and alternative financing forms determine the 
number  of  banking  contacts.  We  find  especially  support  for  the  liquidity  insurance 
argument to have multiple relations. Finally we show that firms having a so-called main 
bank relation tend to have a preference for multiple loan contacts. In the last section we 
summarize and conclude.  
 
2  Theory and empirical evidence on the optimal number of banking relations  
 
One  of  the  most  interesting  fields  in  finance  is  the  topic  of  coordination  problems 
between  suppliers  of  capital.  These  problems  hold  with  respect  to  owners  of  equity 
(which lead to the governance problems like described by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and   4 
the suppliers of debt. Such coordination failures can be harmful and lead to takeover 
failures (like the depositors in the Diamond-Dybvig model) or renegotiation problems 
(see Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). For debt it is natural to distinguish between public 
debt (bonds) and credit. By definition, by selecting private credit the firm opts for a 
higher concentration of claims (see Bris and Welch, 2005).  
 
Across the globe it is widely observed that firms deal with more than one bank. Ongena 
and Smith (2000b) present an overview of studies of various countries and find a range of 
the average number of banking relationships between 1.6 for small US firms in 1987 to 
even 33.2 for Italian firms with a credit line over 500 billion Lira in 1993. Ongena and 
Smith  (2000a)  carry  out  an  international  comparative  overview  of  20  countries  and 
observe that larger firms (as measured by sales) hold more bank relations, but firms that 
do  more  foreign  business  typically  have  less  domestic  banking  contacts.  Country 
variation  in  financial  systems  is  relevant  in  explaining  the  country  variation  in  mean 
banking relations. Firms that reside in countries with poor creditor rights and inefficient 
judicial systems typically have more banking relationships. If the banking sector is not 
concentrated but stable and bond markets are effective, the number of relationships per 
firm is higher. Volpin (2000) puts forward that countries with low shareholder protection 
allow for higher private benefits of control  and through that allow  for  more banking 
relations.  
Horiuchi  (1993,  1994)  presents  the  most  detailed  descriptive  analysis  of  the 
borrowing decisions by Japanese firms up to now. Horiuchi (1993) reports for 1990 an 
average number of bank relations for 126 firms with less than 300 employees of 3.4 and 
for 309 firms with more than 300  employees  an average number of relations of 7.7. 
Horiuchi (1994) reports for 1992 an average (and median) number of 3 relations for 364 
firms (including small firms with less than 10 employees). Note that the sample period is 




   5 
2.1  The theory of multiple bank relationships 
 
The most intuitive explanation of the existence of a single bank relation is based on cost 
minimization. To deal with more than one bank is costly. First, transaction costs increase, 
because  both  screening  and  monitoring  costs  are  duplicated.  It  is  more  expensive  to 
market debt claims to multiple creditors (see Bris and Welch, 2005). These arguments are 
at the core of the Diamond (1984) delegated monitoring model.  The Diamond model 
predicts a firm to deal with a single bank that pools the costs of asymmetric information. 
A  single  bank  moreover  avoids  free-riding  problems  by  private  investors.  So  in  all 
activities prior and during the loan contract it would be cheaper to deal with a single bank. 
But also in ex post cases, like in the case of bankruptcy, multiple relations will increase 
the costs of e.g. handling debt renegotiation (see Boot and Thakor, 1994, and Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1996).  
 
The  second  determinant  of  the  number  of  banking  relationships  is  the  degree  of 
competition in the banking market. If competition is low (a few institutions dominate the 
market) it is likely that the number of banking relationships drops. The incumbent bank 
will be able to extract rents (see Broecker, 1990). On the other hand if competition is 
fierce and a large number of competing banks fight for new loans, firms will try to benefit 
and increase the number of bank contacts. 
 
Third, and related to the second item, is the hold-up problem. If a relationship bank is not 
affected by heavy competition, it might consider using the acquired private corporate 
information  to  extract  rents,  thus  distorting  entrepreneurial  incentives  and  causing 
inefficient  investment  choices  (see  Sharpe,  1990,  and  Rajan,  1992).  Carletti  (2004) 
presents  a  theoretical  monitoring  model  to  explain  this.  Multiple  banking  entails 
duplication  of  effort  and  sharing  of  benefit,  which  lead  to  a  reduction  in  the  overall 
monitoring  intensity  but  not  necessarily  to  higher  loan  rates,  due  to  the  presence  of 
diseconomies of scale in monitoring. Another form of the hold-up problem might also 
exist. In a competitive banking environment a high-quality firm that tries to switch from 
its previous to a new loan provider gets pooled with low-quality firms and might be   6 
forced to pay too high an interest rate. This prevents a high-quality firm from increasing 
the number of banking relationships. How do these issues affect the desired quantity of 
banking relations of a firm? A firm that faces a monopolistic banking industry might 
want to increase the number of contacts and try to force banks to compete in making 
offers (see Von Thadden, 1994). This is true for symmetrically informed banks. If we 
have  the  opposite  case,  an  inside  bank  that  competes  with  outside  banks,  this  might 
change. If outside banks start to compete, the inside bank can use its knowledge on the 
quality of firms to select the good firms and leaving the lemons as leftovers to the outside 
banks. This might lead to too high interest rates and a reduction of the number of credit 
lines. So it is relevant to determine the nature of the existing firm-bank relationships. 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) give a final argument to the competition issue. They argue that 
borrowing from banks with great market power facilitates intertemporal sharing of the 
rent surplus and through that stimulates a single banking relation.  Competition in credit 
markets hinders this process. It might even be so that competition forces rents to the point 
where it is no longer in the interest of any bank to lend to the firm. Petersen and Rajan 
(1995)  argue  that  the  intertemporal  rent  sharing  is  especially  crucial  to  smaller  and 
younger firms.  
 
A fourth class of arguments against the case of single banking relates to using multiple 
contacts as insurance against liquidity or liquidation risk. The worst case for the firm is 
that a profitable project has to be liquidated prematurely. Suppose that the loan includes a 
refinancing  stage.  If  the  relation  bank  cannot  rollover  their  initial  loan  the  firm  in 
liquidity need has to apply for loans from non-relation banks (arm’s-length financiers). 
These  banks  probably  think  that  the  applying  firms  have  ‘lemon’  projects  (see  also 
Detragiache et al., 2000).  
 
A fifth class of arguments is formed by the ability among lenders to coordinate activities 
in  an  environment  with  so-called  soft-budget  constraints.  In  a  largely  decentralized 
economy  banks  cannot  commit  to  finance  unprofitable  long-term  projects  because 
dispersed banks with limited capital will find it costly to coordinate actions (Dewatripont 
and Maskin, 1995). Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Bris and Welch (2005) give a   7 
similar  argument.  In  the  Bolton-Scharfstein-model  the  manager  has  an  incentive  to 
strategically  default  the  project  (e.g.  by  diverting  cash  to  herself).  Coordinating  with 
multiple lenders disciplines the manager. On the other hand it might be the case that 
fewer creditors have more incentives to check managers. Such creditors have an incentive 
to invest more in monitoring activity (see Bris and Welch, 2005). Writing debt contracts 
with multiple lenders is costly though (see the first class of arguments). In any case, a 
decrease of default risk will increase the number of lenders. The same holds to the degree 
of synergy between the assets of the firm (the degree to which the assets are worth more 
together than apart) or the liquidation value.  
 
Finally,  the  type  of  business  activity  might  affect  the  number  of  creditors.  Take  the 
example of a highly innovative, high quality firm that invests to a large extent in R&D. If 
this  firm  believes  that  it  will  be  successful,  it  will  not  be  willing  to  give  all  the 
information  to  multiple  financiers  (see  Yosha,  1995).  Low-quality  firms  on  the  other 
hand might want to contact multiple banks. Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998) analyze 
a model that includes the competition on the output market for firms. The main point is 
again that leakage of information is detrimental to a firm’s success on the output market. 
The firm can avoid this in two ways. First, it decides on the amount of information given 
to creditors, and second, it can change the number of  contacts.  If a  firm gives more 
information  to  a  bank  and  its  quality  is  high,  it  can  get  a  lower  interest  rate.  More 
creditors again intensify competition. Highly rated firms optimally try to deal with many 
banks and will disclose as little information as they can. Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) 
stress the point that it might be optimal for a bank to inform competitors of the innovating 
firm with respect to the new technology in order to avoid financial distress. Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1996) also predict that firms in non-cyclical industries will chose a lower 
number of lenders. 
 
2.2  Optimal number of creditors and main bank relations 
 
     The main bank of a firm is frequently defined as the bank with the largest share of 
loans. However, main bank relations are not simply confined to lending relationships, but 
cover a wider spectrum of aspects. Aoki et al. (1994) stress five aspects of main bank   8 
relations: lending relationship, client issuances of public debt, equity cross-shareholding, 
business  settlement  accounts,  and  provision  of  information  services  and  managerial 
resources. Intertwined with each other, these relations determine the optimal number of 
creditors  for  the  firms  affiliated  with  their  main  bank.  However,  there  are  very  few 
studies directly dealing with the determination of the optimal number of creditors in the 
context of a main bank system.  
 
To  consider  this  issue,  it  is  important  to  understand  why  main  bank  financing  is  so 
prevalent. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) discuss benefits and costs of main bank financing. 
A  main  bank  holds  a  large  share  of  loans  of  affiliated  firms,  which  gives  a  strong 
incentive to collect information about firms’ prospects and to monitor the firms. It helps 
to  mitigate  problems  with  asymmetric  information  that  lead  to  adverse  selection  and 
moral  hazard.  The  studies  of  Kaplan  and  Minton  (1994),  Sheard  (1994a),  Kang  and 
Shivdasani (1995, 1997), Miyajima (1998), and Morck and Nakamura (1999) provide the 
evidence that main banks closely monitor their client firms and dispatch directors to them 
in the event of financial trouble. Close monitoring by a main bank enables other banks to 
reduce the resources spent on gathering information and monitoring, as is suggested by 
Diamond’s delegated monitoring model (see Diamond, 1984). Other banks let the main 
bank monitor the firm on behalf of them. Sheard (1994b) discusses the efficiencies of 
main bank lending from the standpoint of avoidance of monitoring duplication. Having 
the main line of credit from a main bank, it might also be easier for the firm to attract 
more loans from other banks. Close monitoring also helps to identify the types of distress 
their clients face and thus reduce the cost of distress (Hoshi et al., 1990, and Sheard, 
1994c). Furthermore, shareholding by a main bank leads to mitigation of conflict between 
equity holders and debt holders.
1 Taken together, affiliated firms might raise funds easily 
from other banks since other banks do not have to bear the expenses associated with 
lending. Thus the optimal number of creditors will be larger for firms affiliated with a 
main bank than independent firms.   
                                                            
1 It should be noted that group main banks are not always acting in the interest of the 
firms, given that these firms are charged higher interest rates (see Weinstein and Yafeh, 
1998).   9 
    However, it should be noted that concentration of information about affiliated 
firms at a main bank is a double-edged sword. Sheard (1989) argues that a Japanese firm 
might also be afraid of monopoly exploitation by the bank, or banks themselves want to 
share risk, or regulation might block larger loan supply by a single bank. So, there can be 
different arguments, even in the group structure cases, why firms borrow from multiple 
banks. Prowse (1990) argues that debt-rich firms tend to invest in projects that benefit 
shareholders. A way to circumvent this agency problem is to align the debt and equity 
stakes  in  the  firm.  From  a  slightly  different  angle,  we  might  argue  that  too  much 
dependence on main bank is harmful to its affiliated firms.  In the 1990s banks were 
burdened with massive  suffer non-performing loans, which hindered the intermediary 
role  of  banks  severely.  In  this  situation  excessive  reliance  on  a  main  bank  makes  it 
difficult for its affiliated firms to switch loans from one bank to the other since other 
banks have not accumulated information on those firms.     
 
2.3  Empirical evidence 
 
The empirical literature on explaining the number of banking contacts is typically 
more  concentrated  than  its  theoretical  equivalent.  Here  we  discuss  a  few  studies  and 
summarize  these,  if  relevant,  in  Table  1.  Ongena  and  Smith  (2000a,  2000b)  give  an 
overview  of  international  studies  on  single  versus  multiple  banking  relations.  Early 
studies were mainly concerned with the consequences of relationship lending relations on 
the costs and availability of credit to firms. Borrowing from fewer banks is found to lead 
to a larger availability of credit to smaller firms (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, and Cole, 
1998), but more availability to listed firms (Houston and James, 1996) and lower costs 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994, and D´Auria, et al. 1999).  In an early study  Foglia et al. 
(1998),  analyzing  about  1900  Italian  small  and  medium-sized  firms,  find  that  having 
more  bank  relations,  monitoring  of  the  firm  becomes  weaker,  and  financial  fragility 
increases. This study though does not endogenize the number of banking contacts.  
 
Detragiache et al. (2000) present a theoretical model of relationship lending. They show 
that multiple bank contacts can reduce the probability of an early liquidation of a firm’s 
project. Detragiache et al. (2000) test their theory using a set of 1,849 small and medium-  10 
sized Italian firms. They find that the number of relations tends to increase with firm size, 
leverage, and age of the firm. Firms with a lower profitability tend to have more single 
relations. Bank fragility has a positive impact on the number of bank relations. If the size 
of the bank increases the number of relations drops. Ongena and Smith (2001) use a 1996 
survey among large European firms to establish cross-country differences in the number 
of bank relations per firm. They use cash management relations as the unit of observation.  
They use both country- and firm-level data as determinants of the number of banking 
contacts. It appears that on the firm level larger home sales decreases the number of 
banking relations, while  larger worldwide sales increases the number of banking contacts. 
These  characteristics  refer  to  the  relevance  of  the  type  of  business  the  firms  are  in.  
Houston and James (2001) randomly select 250 US firms from the CRSP dataset. This is 
a set of large listed firms that have multiple financing possibilities. They find that a high 
market-to-book  ratio  and  a  high  leverage  decrease  the  probability  of  a  single  bank 
relation.  Firm  size  is  negatively  related  to  single  bank  dependence.  A  high  coverage 
ration indicates a larger probability of a single bank relation. More uncertainty in asset 
returns predicts a higher probability of a single relation. Degryse and Ongena (2001) 
analyze a set of almost all listed Norwegian firms in the years 1979-1995. They find that 
less  profitable,  younger,  more-leveraged,  and  larger  firms  establish  more  banking 
relations. Also relevant to our study, firms having a large main bank relation tend to have 
multiple lending contacts.  Finally, Farinha and Santos (2004) analyze a sample of 1,577 
young Portuguese firms. They are interested in the duration of a single lending relation 
and estimate a survival model. It appears that firms with poor performance and firms with 
large growth options switch with a higher probability to multiple lending relations.  
 
Given the theoretical arguments in section 2.1 we classify the determinants of single-
banking relationships along the six theoretical classes presented above in Table 1 (so a + 
in Table 1 is a positive stimulus for single banking). The classification of variables is in 
some cases arbitrary, but illustrative for our purposes. There is at least mixed evidence 
for the first class: cost minimization. The age of the firm is only found to be important in 
the Portuguese case. The evidence on firm size is mixed. With respect to the industrial 
organization of the banking market (which we combine with the hold-up problem) there   11 
seems to be a clue for the fact that a more concentrated banking market predicts single 
relations. Not all studies present results with a straightforward interpretation though. By 
far the most important category is the class of liquidity/liquidation risk. The coordination 
problems seem to be less relevant. With respect to the business activity there is not much 
hard statistical evidence to be favored.  
 
Table 1 - Overview of empirical results on single-bank relationships 
 
 
Class of explanation/variable  DGG  FS  OS  DO  HJ 
           
1 Cost minimalization           
Firm size  +  -    -  - 
Firm age  0  +    -  0 
Share of defaulted loans recovered  +         
Nonperforming loans  0         
2/3 Competition on the banking market 
and Hold-up problems 
         
Average size of lending banks  +  +       
Group membership  0         
4 Liquidity risk           
Liquidity shocks  +         
Profitability  +      -  - 
Coverage ratio          + 
5 Coordination problems/Soft-budget           
Firm leverage  +  -      - 
Share of first owner  0         
6 Type of business activity           
Patents  0         
R&D  0         
Product innovation  0         
Process innovation  0         
Industry comovement  0         
Variability of asset returns          0 
Home sales      -     
Worldwide sales      +     
           
DGG = Detriagiache, Garella, Guiso (2000)           
FS = Farinha, Santos (2000)           
OS  = Ongena, Smith (2000a)           
DO = Degryse, Ongena (2001)           
HJ = Houston, James (2001)           
 
+ = significant determinant in explaining a choice for a single banking relation; 
0 = insignificant determinant; 
- = significant determinant in explaining a choice for multiple banking   12 
3  Description of the data 
 
The primary sources of data are the Financial Statement Data (FSD) and Sources of 
Loans Data (SLD) of individual firms. Both sets are provided by the Development Bank 
of Japan. The FSD includes more than 500 items of balance sheet accounts, profit and 
loss  accounts,  and  cash  flow  statements.  Moreover,  the  set  contains  qualitative 
information  on  stock  ownership,  like  the  names  of  the  top-10  shareholders  and  their 
equity stakes. SLD indicates from which financial institution(s) the firms attract their 
long-term loans.
2 So we know the identity of the top-10 equity and loan owners. The FSD 
data cover more than 2,000 firms listed on the main Japanese stock markets (Tokyo, 
Osaka, Nagoya, etc.) from 1957 onwards. The SLD data are, however, available only 
after 1982. We combine both sources and transform all available information into firm-
year  observations.  We  checked  whether  our  data  reflect  the  industrial  sector  of  the 
Japanese economy by mapping our sample on the SNA-classification. Indeed we have a 
representative sample, although listed firms have an overrepresentation in manufacturing. 
 
The SLD data set restricts our abilities to define long-term loan relations. The SLD-set 
does not contain loan-specific information. So we define the total number of banks that 
provided long-term loans in year t as the number of long-term loan banking contacts. For 
most of those loans it will be likely that the relationship continues up to the next year, but 
we cannot check whether the same bank actually provides the same long-term loan next 
year. So suppose that a normal long-term loan will last for three years and a firm has two 
providers: bank A grants the loan at t-1, bank B at time t. In our set we observe one bank 
contact at time t-1, 2 at times t and t+1 and only 1 at time t+2.  
 
The  initial  total  number  of  firm-year  observations  from  1982  to  1999  is  34,939.  In 
combining the two sets, however, some of the observations are excluded mainly due to 
inconsistencies between the two data sets. For instance, the outstanding long-term loans 
                                                            
2 The label financial institution refers to life- and non-life insurance companies as well as 
public and private banks. Insurance companies and banks are the main long-term funds   13 
in the SLD data sometimes do not match the balance sheet registration of long-term loans 
in the FSD source. Also, the source of the long-term loans is in some cases classified by 
miscellaneous financial institutions, so obviously we cannot identify the number of bank 
relations. This is also true for the case of classification as foreign banks; that is to say, the 
data set does not indicate the specific name of the foreign bank (this holds for only 5 per 
cent of the firms at the maximum). As a result of data screening, we have 20,740 firm-
year observations.
3 Table 2 presents the number of long-term bank  relations over the 
sample period. We show the time series of the number of banking relations for various 
cases. We distinguish: no loans (0), a single loan (1), 2 to 4 loans, 5 to 7 loans, 8-10 loans, 
11-15 loans, and over 16 loans. In the bottom line of Table 2 we give the percentage of 
single loans (see also Figure 1). Table 2 shows that there is a general increase of the 
number of loans over time. It also appears that especially the classes with multiple loans 
(over 10 loans) seem to increase above average.   
 
We also provide the mean and the median of the number of long-term loan relations 
(Figure 2). As can be seen from Figure 2 the average number of relations decreases from 
7.74 in 1982 and reaches a low level of 6.65 in 1989. After 1990, the number moves 
around 7 except for the sharp decline in 1997. This means that concentration of long-term 
loans  has  been  gradually  promoted  towards  the  bubble  period  but  recovered  to  the 
original level after the collapse of the bubble. As shown in Figure 2, however, the median 
of the number of long-term bank relations is quite stable over the sample period.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
suppliers in Japan. Note that we are not able to identify the identity of foreign banks. In 
our sample foreign banks supply less than five per cent of the loan totals. 
3 It should be noted, however, that the calendar year does not correspond to the actual 
accounting period of the firm.  For example, the firm with the accounting period starting 
in April 1998 and ending in March 1999 is classified as 1999 in spite that the firm 
actually operates 9 months in 1998 and only 3 months in 1999. Table 2 - Number of bank relations with respect to long-term loans (NBL) by year 
  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  Total 
0  158  200  235  258  283  315  355  391  406  404  409  404  416  446  479  502  516  508  6685 
1  49  59  59  66  70  82  86  90  96  93  69  62  69  65  69  94  103  89  1370 
2≤NBL≤4  142  140  154  158  155  149  149  172  187  191  192  207  189  213  220  260  254  244  3376 
5≤NBL≤7  162  176  159  160  188  179  184  184  189  202  204  187  207  222  230  236  272  286  3627 
8≤NBL≤10  117  126  148  144  138  140  126  146  153  159  156  165  140  157  170  168  187  195  2735 
11≤NBL≤15  104  90  87  106  89  96  88  85  94  103  111  126  142  143  134  126  138  157  2019 
16≤NBL  47  49  48  43  48  44  42  35  42  51  50  57  54  56  54  49  84  75  928 
Total  779  840  890  935  971  1005  1030  1103  1167  1203  1191  1208  1217  1302  1356  1435  1554  1554  20740 
With long-term 
loans  621  640  655  677  688  690  675  712  761  799  782  804  801  856  877  933  1038  1046  14055 
(Percentage) (79,7) (76,2) (73,6) (72,4) (70,9) (68,7) (65,5) (64,6) (65,2) (66,4) (65,7) (66,6) (65,8) (65,7) (64,7) (65,0) (66,8) (67,3)  (67,8) 
Percentage single 
relation  7,9  9,2  9,0  9,7  10,2  11,9  12,7  12,6  12,6  11,6  8,8  7,7  8,6  7,6  7,9  10,1  9,9  8,5  9,7 
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To end this part of the description we computed the Herfindahl index for long-term loans 
per firm (see Figure 3). The average of this index increases from 0.370 in 1982 to its 
maximum of 0.409 in 1990. The same tendency can be seen for the median value. The 





























































































































































mean median  16 
concentration, however, gradually decreases towards its lowest level 0.335 in 1995 and 
increases again after. 
 
Next  to  the  description  of  the  number  of  loan  contacts  we  highlight  the  financial 
governance  of  Japanese firms.  The  Japanese  industrial  organization  differs  to  a  large 
extent  from  most  western  equivalents.  Mutual  ownership  of  stock  is  quite  common, 
especially in the industrial group structures (keiretsu). Within the group structure long-
lived equity holdings and lender relations are the key financial characteristics. As known, 
banks play a central role in these business groups, so it is valuable to give some idea of 
the relation between simultaneous holdings of loans and equity, especially if we want to 
test the hypothesis that firms that have a main bank relation want fewer banking contacts. 
In  order  to  consider  the relationship  between  loan  activity  and  equity  ownership,  we 
classify our firm-year observations into the following seven categories with respect to a 
so-called Main Bank Dummy (MBD):  
 
MBD1: if the largest equity owner is also the largest debt owner; 
MBD2: if the largest equity owner resorts under the top-3 debt owners; 
MBD3: if the largest equity owner resorts under the top-10 debt owners; 
MBD4: if the largest debt owner resorts under the top-3 equity owners; 
MBD5: if the largest debt owner resorts under the top-10 equity owners; 
MBD6: if one of the top-3 equity owners resorts under the top-3 debt owners; 
MBD7: if one of the top-10 equity owners resorts under the top-10 debt owners. 
 
Table 3 presents the percentage of firms for the above seven cases in our sample by year. 
As is expected, the first class is the rarest case: a little more than 5 percent of the firm-
year observations fall into this class. Note that we consider all equity holders, so also 
non-bank  equity  holders.  Although  equity  ownership  by  banks  is  highly  restricted  in 
Japan
4, still about half of the firm-year observations are classified in MBD6 and about 90 
                                                            
4 In Japan the maximum share of equity holding of a specific firm by a bank is restricted 
to the maximum of 5 percent since 1987. Before 1987, starting in 1953, this figure was 
10% (see Flath, 1993). For insurance companies the maximum limit is 10%. It should be 
noted that in our data set the financial institution includes life-insurance companies as   17 
percent of the firm-year observations in our sample fall in the class MBD7. How does the 
governance variable MBD affect the number of bank contacts? First of all, moving from 
MBD1 to MBD3 for instance increases the number of multiple bank contacts. Although 
debt contains also non-loans, the probability of a single lending relation decreases if the 
largest equity holder moves from the first debt holder to a top-ten debt holder. If a top-ten 
debt holder moves from a top-ten equity holding position to the single top equity holder 
one could argue that the relative probability of a single loan relation will become larger. 
The bank can control the firm not only via the supply of loans, but also as a top equity 
holder. So the bank is probably willing to offset the liquidity risk the firm faces, lowering 
the firm's intentions to contact multiple banks. The firm has less costs of asymmetric 
information and will also prefer a single relationship more (see also Sheard, 1989).    
                                                                                                                                                                             
well as private banking companies. The equities held by individual and institutions 
through trust banks are classified as individual holdings.   18 
 
 
Table 3 The relationship between stockholders and debt suppliers 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)   
  top1 share 
holder = top1 
long-term 
debt holder 

































1982  4.83  8.86  14.33  23.99  56.36  40.74  83.90   
1983  4.22  8.28  12.81  25.16  57.03  42.34  84.22   
1984  5.19  10.08  14.05  25.95  59.24  43.97  85.34   
1985  4.73  10.19  13.59  26.29  59.97  43.87  84.93   
1986  4.65  8.72  12.21  26.45  61.63  44.77  85.61   
1987  4.78  9.28  12.61  28.41  63.77  45.36  87.25   
1988  4.59  8.74  12.30  25.93  63.41  42.96  86.52   
1989  5.06  9.13  13.20  30.76  66.57  46.63  87.36   
1990  4.99  10.38  14.45  31.27  64.78  46.78  87.78   
1991  4.88  10.01  14.02  31.79  63.70  46.56  87.23   
1992  3.58  10.23  14.58  31.84  64.45  49.10  88.87   
1993  5.22  12.19  16.67  34.95  68.28  51.99  90.17   
1994  4.49  10.99  15.61  35.21  69.91  50.81  90.76   
1995  5.84  11.68  16.71  32.71  68.69  48.95  90.42   
1996  5.02  11.63  15.28  33.30  72.63  48.69  89.85   
1997  5.47  10.83  14.68  34.30  72.45  49.30  88.96   
1998  5.78  10.50  14.35  35.45  72.93  47.69  89.88   
1999  5.83  11.09  14.91  36.81  72.75  49.14  89.39   
Total  5.01  10.27  14.35  31.16  66.23  46.99  87.96    
4  Explaining Japanese multiple bank relationships  
 
We model the number of bank relations from the perspective of the firm. So we argue 
that the number of bank contacts is demand driven. One could bring to the fore that 
supply arguments might interfere: banks might also refuse loan supply. With our dataset 
we are not able to identify these supply arguments, because we do not have bank-specific 
information. We argue that banks will probably want to sell their products, especially in 
the last decade, and be certainly interested in supplying services to large listed firms. Of 
course banks can control the terms of the contracts, but this will not affect the number of 
contracts to a large extent.  
 
We  model  a  demand  for  banking  contacts  model.  Decomposing  the  total  observed 
variance into inter-firm and temporal variance and leads to the conclusion that we reject 
the  hypothesis  that  either  cross-section  or  time  variance  dominates  the  nature  of  the 
observations.  So  we  proceed  by  explaining  firm-year  observations  instead  of  using  a 
dynamic panel. We do so in three steps. First we estimate the decision to have a single 
bank  contact  versus  multiple  loans  using  a  simple  logit  model.  Next,  we  model  the 
decision to opt for multiple loans in more detail by estimating a multinomial logit model. 
Finally we present evidence on the Herfindahl index of loan concentration using a Tobit 
model.  Given  the  time-series  nature  of  our  data  for  long-term  loans,  and  the 
macroeconomic bubble-pattern, we use various sub-samples: 
1.  1982-1999; 
2.  1982-1989 (the ‘bubble’ period); 
3.  1990-1999 (the post-‘bubble’ period). 
 
We use the following variables to explain loan concentration: 
•  A variable that indicates the size of the firm: total real sales (SAL); 
•  A variable that indicates profitability (ROA). Here we note that in all our results 
Tobin’s Q did not play a significant role (results available upon request); 
•  A variable that indicates solvability (debt-to-assets ratio, DAR);   20 
•  A variables that indicates liquidity (liquid-to-total assets, LAR); 
•  Variables that indicate alternative financing forms. We use the corporate bonds to 
debt ratio (CBR) and the short-term loan to debt ratio (SLR); 
•  A variable that indicates the R&D activity of the firm: R&D expense to total sales. 
Moreover,  we  include  industry  dummies  (not  reported  in  the  tables)  and  year 
dummies (not reported in the tables). 
•  A variable that indicates a relation between top-x loan and top-y equity ownership 
(MBDi, i=1,…,7). We use the 7 indicators as explained above. 
 
First we present a logit-model of the decision to have either a single loan, represented by 
Y=1, or to have multiple loans (Y=0). The results are presented in Table 4. In Table 4 we 
give three panels (A, B, and C) that describe the two sub-samples as well as the whole 
sample period. The rows in each panel give the results for each type of main bank dummy 
variables, say MBDi (i=1,…,7) as listed above. The columns give the various estimated 
parameters of the determinants (see also above). In the last column we give the pseudo-R-
squared and the Correct Prediction Rate (CPR). The numbers of observations used in 
each sub-sample are denoted at the top of each panel. At the bottom of each panel we also 
provide  the  marginal  derivatives  of  the  determinants  x  on  the  probability  of  a  single 
relation P: dP/dx. We shade the significant estimated parameters at the 5% confidence  
level (asymptotic t-values between the brackets below the estimated parameters).    21 
Table 4 - Estimation results for the binary logit model (single Y=1) 
Panel A. Whole period: 1982-99 
     SAL  ROA  DAR  LAR  CBR  SLR  R&D  MBD  R
2/CPR 
(1)  MBD1  0.00019  -0.0086  -0.0412  0.0371  0.0159  -0.0007  -0.0973  -0.6442  0.0655 
    (0.85)  (0.96)  (19.6)  (15.4)  (7.81)  (0.30)  (4.26)  (3.67)  0.9030 
(2)  MBD2  0.00033  -0.0081  -0.0406  0.0366  0.0165  -0.0003  -0.0915  -1.4830  0.0727 
    (1.49)  (0.92)  (19.2)  (15.2)  (8.10)  (0.13)  (4.02)  (8.62)  0.9031 
(3)  MBD3  0.00047  -0.0076  -0.0401  0.0360  0.0174  -0.0005  -0.0795  -1.9466  0.0810 
    (2.19)  (0.86)  (19.0)  (15.0)  (8.52)  (0.20)  (3.46)  (11.3)  0.9035 
(4)  MBD4  0.00010  -0.0106  -0.0396  0.0367  0.0153  -0.0013  -0.0927  -0.8158  0.0737 
    (0.45)  (1.22)  (18.8)  (15.2)  (7.48)  (0.55)  (4.07)  (10.6)  0.9039 
(5)  MBD5  -0.00015  -0.0087  -0.0373  0.0361  0.0142  -0.0013  -0.1058  -1.0356  0.0853 
    (0.59)  (0.98)  (17.5)  (14.8)  (6.84)  (0.56)  (4.52)  (16.7)  0.9029 
(6)  MBD6  0.00021  -0.0133  -0.0378  0.0357  0.0154  -0.0007  -0.0924  -1.5811  0.1041 
    (0.92)  (1.61)  (17.9)  (14.7)  (7.41)  (0.31)  (4.07)  (20.6)  0.9031 
(7)  MBD7  -0.00028  -0.0142  -0.0295  0.0343  0.0136  0.0009  -0.1155  -2.8237  0.1891 
     (0.95)  (1.61)  (12.7)  (12.9)  (5.89)  (0.36)  (4.44)  (39.6)  0.9163 
                   
(1) MBD1 
 
0.0155  -0.0020  -0.0038  0.0025  0.0012  -0.0001  -0.0084  -0.0516 
(2) MBD2 
MBD4 
0.0265  -0.0019  -0.0038  0.0025  0.0012  -0.0001  -0.0079  -0.1215 
(3) MBD3  0.0383  -0.0018  -0.0037  0.0024  0.0013  -0.0001  -0.0069  -0.1589 
(4) MBD4  0.0085  -0.0020  -0.0037  0.0025  0.0011  -0.0001  -0.0080  -0.0668 
(5) MBD5  -0.0127  -0.0018  -0.0034  0.0024  0.0010  -0.0001  -0.0089  -0.0842 
(6) MBD6  0.0159  -0.0020  -0.0034  0.0023  0.0011  -0.0001  -0.0077  -0.1246 
(7) MBD7  -0.0179  -0.0013  -0.0021  0.0020  0.0008  0.0000  -0.0075  -0.1830 
 
Panel B. Bubble period: 1982-89 
(1) MBD1  0.00059  -0.0001  -0.0501  0.0374  0.0087  -0.0045  -0.1776  -0.8325  0.0901 
    (2.02)  (0.01)  (13.9)  (9.03)  (2.22)  (1.20)  (4.59)  (2.81)  0.8960 
(2) MBD2  0.00065  0.0001  -0.0499  0.0372  0.0094  -0.0040  -0.1733  -1.6331  0.0980 
    (2.20)  (0.00)  (13.9)  (9.01)  (2.38)  (1.08)  (4.46)  (5.61)  0.8964 
(3) MBD3  0.00075  -0.0001  -0.0499  0.0371  0.0105  -0.0044  -0.1603  -2.1410  0.1080 
    (2.47)  (0.00)  (13.8)  (8.94)  (2.67)  (1.18)  (4.06)  (7.38)  0.8964 
(4) MBD4  0.00049  -0.0015  -0.0490  0.0367  0.0080  -0.0052  -0.1733  -0.9426  0.0996 
    (1.66)  (0.10)  (13.6)  (8.86)  (2.02)  (1.37)  (4.48)  (7.02)  0.8954 
(5) MBD5  0.00030  0.0029  -0.0449  0.0356  0.0071  -0.0047  -0.1974  -1.1117  0.1124 
    (0.99)  (0.20)  (12.3)  (8.51)  (1.78)  (1.26)  (4.98)  (10.9)  0.8988 
(6) MBD6  0.00048  -0.0100  -0.0480  0.0351  0.0090  -0.0041  -0.1646  -1.7969  0.1367 
    (1.63)  (0.67)  (13.0)  (8.41)  (2.24)  (1.09)  (4.19)  (13.5)  0.8951 
(7) MBD7  0.00030  -0.0111  -0.0354  0.0317  0.0050  -0.0033  -0.1884  -3.0019  0.2350 
     (0.81)  (0.71)  (8.59)  (6.74)  (1.09)  (0.84)  (4.11)  (25.3)  0.9181 
                   
(1) MBD1 
 
0.0156  -0.0007  -0.0034  0.0030  0.0013  -0.0001  -0.0079  -0.0526 
(2) MBD2 
MBD4 
0.0267  -0.0007  -0.0033  0.0030  0.0013  0.0000  -0.0074  -0.1201 
(3) MBD3  0.0376  -0.0006  -0.0032  0.0029  0.0014  0.0000  -0.0064  -0.1562 
(4) MBD4  0.0001  -0.0009  -0.0032  0.0030  0.0012  -0.0001  -0.0075  -0.0658 
(5) MBD5  -0.0119  -0.0007  -0.0030  0.0029  0.0011  -0.0001  -0.0084  -0.0820   22 
(6) MBD6  0.0160  -0.0010  -0.0029  0.0028  0.0012  -0.0001  -0.0072  -0.1227 
(7) MBD7  -0.0182  -0.0009  -0.0019  0.0022  0.0009  0.0001  -0.0074  -0.1813 
 
Panel C. Post-Bubbles period: 1990-99 
    SAL  ROA  DAR  LAR  CBR  SLR  R&D  MBD  R
2/CPR 
(1) MBD1  -0.00026  -0.0160  -0.0363  0.0385  0.0182  0.0014  -0.0485  -0.5111  0.0556 
    (0.73)  (1.53)  (13.7)  (13.0)  (7.56)  (0.46)  (1.73)  (2.34)  0.9066 
(2) MBD2  -0.00008  -0.0153  -0.0353  0.0377  0.0188  0.0017  -0.0417  -1.3819  0.0622 
    (0.24)  (1.47)  (13.4)  (12.7)  (7.75)  (0.56)  (1.50)  (6.47)  0.9069 
(3) MBD3  0.00010  -0.0143  -0.0346  0.0369  0.0195  0.0017  -0.0300  -1.8316  0.0696 
    (0.31)  (1.38)  (13.1)  (12.5)  (8.06)  (0.56)  (1.07)  (8.57)  0.9066 
(4) MBD4  -0.00035  -0.0178  -0.0346  0.0383  0.0179  0.0009  -0.0445  -0.7707  0.0635 
    (0.99)  (1.78)  (13.1)  (12.8)  (7.38)  (0.29)  (1.60)  (8.08)  0.9064 
(5) MBD5  -0.00068  -0.0172  -0.0333  0.0380  0.0168  0.0008  -0.0509  -1.0050  0.0740 
    (1.75)  (1.66)  (12.5)  (12.6)  (6.85)  (0.26)  (1.80)  (12.7)  0.9071 
(6) MBD6  -0.00019  -0.0174  -0.0328  0.0373  0.0178  0.0015  -0.0495  -1.4747  0.0897 
    (0.55)  (1.83)  (12.5)  (12.5)  (7.26)  (0.50)  (1.80)  (15.4)  0.9077 
(7) MBD7  -0.00104  -0.0179  -0.0268  0.0366  0.0168  0.0033  -0.0721  -2.7701  0.1675 




-0.0203  -0.0013  -0.0029  0.0031  0.0014  0.0001  -0.0038  -0.0405 
(2) MBD2 
MBD4 
-0.0064  -0.0012  -0.0028  0.0030  0.0015  0.0001  -0.0033  -0.1088 
(3) MBD3  0.0081  -0.0011  -0.0027  0.0029  0.0015  0.0001  -0.0023  -0.1431 
(4) MBD4  -0.0278  -0.0014  -0.0027  0.0030  0.0014  0.0001  -0.0035  -0.0605 
(5) MBD5  -0.0523  -0.0013  -0.0026  0.0029  0.0013  0.0001  -0.0039  -0.0775 
(6) MBD6  -0.0143  -0.0013  -0.0025  0.0028  0.0014  0.0001  -0.0038  -0.1119 
(7) MBD7  -0.0661  -0.0011  -0.0017  0.0023  0.0011  0.0002  -0.0046  -0.1765 
 
CBR = corporate bonds to total debt; 
DAR = debt-to-assets ratio; 
LAR = liquid assets to total assets ratio; 
MBDi = main-bank dummy variable = 1 if a main bank loan supplies are also a main 
equity holders (subscript i indicates the relative importance both in loan and equity 
holding, see Section 3); 
NBL = number of long-term bank loans; 
ROA = return on assets (profits after tax / the average of the total asset at the beginning 
and the end of period); 
R&D = R&D expenditure to total sales; 
SAL = total sales, corresponding probability dP/dx is in terms of 10
3; 
SLR = short-term loans to total debt. 
   23 
Table 4 shows that a higher debt-to-assets ratio (DAR) decreases the probability of a 
single loan relation in all cases. This is a natural effect: more debt implies a higher loan 
demand, which increases the probability of multiple loans. It is also clear that a higher 
liquid to total assets ratio (LAR) increases the probability of a single bank relation. Firms 
with relatively more liquid assets do not need liquidity insurance and rely on a single 
bank. Table 4 also shows that variables that represent the size of the firm (SAL) and 
profitability (ROA) do not have a systematic impact on loan decisions. Of the alternative 
financing forms (short-term loans SLR and the corporate bond to total debt ratio CBR) 
only  the  corporate  bond  to  debt  ratio  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  single  versus 
multiple  loan  relation  decision.  A  higher  value  of  CBR  indicates  two  features:  more 
bonds  relative  to  loans  will  increase  the  probability  of  a  single  loan  by  itself.  But 
secondly, as explained above, corporate bonds also signal quality. A higher bond rating 
reduces the need for multiple banking contacts. All the main bank dummies MBDi have a 
significant negative impact on the probability of a single bank relation. The firm might 
use a main bank relation as a signal of quality in attracting other debt suppliers’ attention. 
As  known  (see  Weinstein  and  Yafeh,1998))  main  banks  charge  higher  interest  rates, 
which might force firms to look for cheaper alternatives. On the other hand, it might be in 
the interest of the main bank as an equity holder to have some liquidity insurance. If we 
compare the results of the MBDi-lines one should note that for the cases where the bank is 
the largest equity holder, the probability of single borrowing relations decreases with a 
more modest position of the bank as a top-debt supplier. The other way round, if the bank 
is the largest supplier of debt, the probability of a single relation increases if the bank 
becomes a more important equity holder. So there are two effects: a main bank relation 
leads to a larger probability of multiple banking contacts, but equity concentration leads 
to a relatively higher probability of a single loan. 
 
Comparing the bubble and post-bubble period one can observe that there are no real large 
differences in terms of marginal derivatives. An increase of the debt-to-assets ratio by 1% 
decreases the probability of a single relation in the bubble period by 0.5% and by 0.3% in 
the post-bubble period.  The other derivatives are comparable  across sub-periods. The 
most striking difference is the impact of R&D-expenses. In the bubble period more R&D   24 
expenses decrease the probability of a single relation: this supports the Bhattacharya-
Chiesa  hypothesis  (see  Section  2).  In  the  post-bubble  period  this  impact  of  R&D 
expenses vanishes.  The R-squared is around 0.1, but the correct prediction rate is around 
90 percent for all models. In general, we can conceive the relatively stable relationship 
between  the  several  determinants  and  the  single-multiple  decision  irrespective  of  the 
choice of MBDi’s.  
 
Next we analyze the decision of multiple loan contacts further (see for a similar approach 
Detragiache et al., 2000). That is to say, once firms decided to have multiple loans, how 
many relations do they have? We model five classes: 
1.   2-4 relationships (Y=0); 
2.   5-7 relationships (Y=1); 
3.   8-10 relationships (Y=2); 
4.   11-15 relationships (Y=3); 
5.   16 and more relationships (Y=4). 
Table 5 contains the results of the estimated multinomial logit model. We use the same 
structure  as  presented  in  Table  4  again.  For  each  panel  we  present  the  estimated 
parameters and the dP/dx values. In estimating the model, the parameters for Y=0 (the 
smallest number of relations, 2-4 relations) are normalized to zero. So, all parameters 
should be interpreted as changes from the base case Y=0. We include only the results for 
one of the main bank relation variables MBD3 .  
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Table 5 - Estimation results multinomial logit-model for number of bank relations   
      Panel A. Whole period: 1982-1999, R
2=0.2423 
     SAL  ROA  DAR  LAR  CBR  SLR  R&D  MBD3 
(2)  5-7  -0.00090  -0.0108  0.0217  -0.0180  -0.0065  0.0002  -0.0277  0.6715 
    (2.40)  (1.57)  (12.3)  (9.29)  (3.36)  (0.11)  (1.56)  (8.12) 
(3)  8-10  0.00045  0.0177  0.0469  -0.0364  -0.0088  -0.0077  0.0057  0.9979 
    (1.30)  (2.29)  (23.2)  (17.1)  (4.08)  (3.60)  (0.30)  (11.6) 
(4)  11-15  0.00231  0.0100  0.0580  -0.0386  -0.0062  -0.0107  -0.0006  1.3116 
    (7.28)  (1.17)  (25.1)  (16.5)  (2.57)  (4.41)  (0.03)  (14.6) 
(5)  16-  0.00304  0.0214  0.0817  -0.0584  0.0014  -0.0049  0.1223  1.6701 
     (9.18)  (1.92)  (24.2)  (19.7)  (0.44)  (1.51)  (4.66)  (15.1) 
 
(1)  2-4  -0.0593  -0.0006  -0.0069  0.0052  0.0011  0.0008  0.0006  -0.1654 
(2)  5-7  -0.3494  -0.0040  -0.0022  0.0012  -0.0005  0.0010  -0.0077  -0.0082 
(3)  8-10  -0.0001  0.0028  0.0029  -0.0025  -0.0009  -0.0008  0.0007  0.0476 
(4)  11-15  0.2647  0.0007  0.0034  -0.0019  -0.0002  -0.0010  -0.0011  0.0749 
(5)  16-  0.1494  0.0010  0.0028  -0.0020  0.0004  0.0000  0.0075  0.0510 
                   
Panel B. Bubble period: 1982-1989, R
2=0.2804 
(2)  5-7  -0.00146  -0.0355  0.0277  -0.0191  0.0030  -0.0015  0.0180  0.9220 
    (2.27)  (2.62)  (8.45)  (5.26)  (0.69)  (0.46)  (0.59)  (6.32) 
(3)  8-10  0.00020  -0.0086  0.0557  -0.0411  0.0122  -0.0016  0.0112  1.3036 
    (0.35)  (0.63)  (15.0)  (10.4)  (2.57)  (0.47)  (0.32)  (8.67) 
(4)  11-15  0.00182  -0.0165  0.0711  -0.0439  0.0053  -0.0173  0.0226  1.5435 
    (3.33)  (1.03)  (16.2)  (10.1)  (0.94)  (4.15)  (0.58)  (9.61) 
(5)  16-  0.00221  0.0116  0.0973  -0.0714  0.0340  0.0033  0.1938  1.7377 
     (3.91)  (0.59)  (15.8)  (13.4)  (4.95)  (0.62)  (4.26)  (8.69) 
                   
(1)  2-4  0.0275  0.0035  -0.0079  0.0055  -0.0013  0.0007  -0.0046  -0.1971 
(2)  5-7  -0.4092  -0.0060  -0.0025  0.0018  -0.0009  0.0005  -0.0010  0.0089 
(3)  8-10  0.0210  0.0013  0.0032  -0.0028  0.0011  0.0004  -0.0035  0.0715 
(4)  11-15  0.2415  -0.0004  0.0040  -0.0020  -0.0005  -0.0021  -0.0014  0.0758 
(5)  16-  0.1192  0.0016  0.0032  -0.0025  0.0016  0.0005  0.0105  0.0409 
 
Panel C. Post-Bubble period: 1990-1999, R
2=0.2424 
(2)  5-7  -0.00059  0.0027  0.0198  -0.0196  -0.0087  0.0008  -0.0519  0.5509 
    (1.25)  (0.35)  (9.28)  (8.51)  (3.98)  (0.33)  (2.32)  (5.43) 
(3)  8-10  0.00058  0.0331  0.0442  -0.0351  -0.0144  -0.0101  0.0092  0.8443 
    (1.31)  (3.45)  (18.02)  (13.85)  (5.80)  (3.69)  (0.39)  (8.00) 
(4)  11-15  0.00261  0.0267  0.0529  -0.0378  -0.0082  -0.0069  -0.0089  1.2121 
    (6.49)  (2.58)  (19.05)  (13.58)  (3.04)  (2.27)  (0.35)  (11.1) 
(5)  16-  0.00351  0.0288  0.0764  -0.0526  -0.0070  -0.0084  0.0829  1.6235 
     (8.39)  (2.15)  (18.55)  (14.71)  (1.84)  (2.01)  (2.50)  (12.1) 
 
(1)  2-4  -0.1115  -0.0031  -0.0065  0.0053  0.0018  0.0008  0.0031  -0.1481 
(2)  5-7  -0.3133  -0.0030  -0.0021  0.0006  -0.0004  0.0012  -0.0117  -0.0164 
(3)  8-10  -0.0199  0.0037  0.0029  -0.0023  -0.0014  -0.0013  0.0036  0.0348 
(4)  11-15  0.2817  0.0016  0.0031  -0.0019  -0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0006  0.0760 
(5)  16-  0.1629  0.0007  0.0026  -0.0016  0.0001  -0.0002  0.0056  0.0536   26 
 
Table 5 shows that in most cases there is a split between less than and more than 8 
banking contacts. Take for example the impact of the debt-to-assets ratio (DAR). A lower 
solvability (higher DAR) decreases the probability of having less than 8 contacts, and 
increases the probabilities of the large contact classes. For the liquid assets ratio (LAR) 
the reverse holds. Liquidity-rich firms have higher probabilities of having up to 8 bank 
contacts.  For  the  main-bank  dummy  variable  MBD3  we  find  that  the  probability  of 
multiple  banking  contacts  (more  than  8)  increases.  Apart  from  these  main  three 
determinants, we now also observe that size (SAL), profitability (ROA), and the financing 
alternatives matter in some cases. We find that larger firms want more bank relations, 
especially for the large numbers of banking contacts (more than 11). There is also some 
evidence that in the post-bubble period profitability matters. More profitable firms want 
more bank relations; this finding implies that most of the loss-making firms will tend to 
have  fewer  bank  relations.  Alternative  financing  forms  (the  availability  of  corporate 
bonds, CBR, and short-term loans SLR) tend to make firms opt for a moderate (up to 8 
loan contacts) or extensive number of banking relations. For the first group there could be 
substitution of financing means, while for the latter group the signaling function might be 
relevant.  R&D-intensive  firms  tend  to  have  a  larger  probability  of  having  multiple 
relations (more than 16).  We do not find striking differences between the bubble and 
post-bubble  period  in  this  model.  The  previous  results  relate  to  the  discrete  lending 
choice. Next we use a continuous variable as a dependent variable, the Herfindahl-index, 
as a robustness check.  The Herfindahl index is limited in range (by definition in the 
interval [0,1]). Prior to estimating the model we transformed the original index by taking 
the logarithm and multiplying it by -1. By this transformation the dependent variable will 
loose its upper bound. After this transformation we apply an ordinary Tobit model with a 
lower truncation at zero. Table 6 gives the estimation results. It should be noted that a 
larger  value  of  the  dependent  variable  implies  a  lower  concentration  (multiple  loan 
contacts). A plus sign in the table therefore indicates that an increase of the determining 
variable  will  lead  to  more  banking  relations.  Table  6  includes  the  same  panels  and 
determinants as before. We give the results for all our main bank relation variables MBDi 
(i=1,…7). 
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Table 6 - Estimation results: Tobit-model for the Herfindahl index 
 
 
Panel A. Whole period: 1982-99 
     SAL  ROA  DAR  LAR  CBR  SLR  R&D  MBD  LH/￿ 
(1)  MBD1  0.00033  0.0068  0.0122  -0.0102  -0.0024  -0.0003  0.0168  0.1414  -14859.0 
    (7.28)  (4.58)  (30.7)  (23.7)  (5.36)  (0.71)  (4.02)  (5.29)  0.6831
(2)  MBD2  0.00029  0.0066  0.0121  -0.0102  -0.0026  -0.0005  0.0149  0.2373  -14797.7 
    (6.37)  (4.51)  (30.5)  (23.8)  (5.74)  (1.03)  (3.58)  (12.3)  0.6802
(3)  MBD3  0.00024  0.0066  0.0119  -0.0101  -0.0029  -0.0004  0.0121  0.3194  -14694.9 
    (5.24)  (4.53)  (30.4)  (23.8)  (6.54)  (0.96)  (2.93)  (19.0)  0.6751
(4)  MBD4  0.00036  0.0068  0.0120  -0.0102  -0.0023  -0.0003  0.0164  0.1355  -14815.8 
    (7.77)  (4.64)  (30.2)  (23.7)  (5.17)  (0.58)  (3.94)  (10.7)  0.6812
(5)  MBD5  0.00040  0.0065  0.0116  -0.0101  -0.0021  -0.0002  0.0181  0.2325  -14702.7 
    (8.86)  (4.44)  (29.4)  (23.7)  (4.66)  (0.52)  (4.37)  (18.5)  0.6762
(6)  MBD6  0.00031  0.0069  0.0116  -0.0100  -0.0025  -0.0005  0.0165  0.2823  -14581.4 
    (6.94)  (4.77)  (29.7)  (23.7)  (5.53)  (1.06)  (4.01)  (24.3)  0.6705
(7)  MBD7  0.00038  0.0055  0.0096  -0.0090  -0.0017  -0.0006  0.0166  0.9495  -13488.7 
     (9.08)  (4.03)  (26.1)  (22.7)  (4.11)  (1.54)  (4.31)  (53.5)  0.6260
                   
Panel B. Bubble period: 1982-89 
(1) MBD1  0.00004  0.0062  0.0154  -0.0119  0.0020  0.0014  0.0273  0.1807  -5533.0 
    (0.49)  (2.29)  (21.9)  (15.6)  (2.11)  (1.97)  (3.87)  (4.18)  0.6664
(2) MBD2  0.00001  0.0062  0.0154  -0.0119  0.0019  0.0013  0.0257  0.2347  -5515.1 
    (0.09)  (2.28)  (21.9)  (15.7)  (2.01)  (1.80)  (3.66)  (7.31)  0.6643
(3) MBD3  -0.00005  0.0062  0.0153  -0.0120  0.0015  0.0014  0.0238  0.3163  -5476.3 
    (0.58)  (2.29)  (22.0)  (15.8)  (1.54)  (1.91)  (3.41)  (11.5)  0.6595
(4) MBD4  0.00006  0.0062  0.0152  -0.0118  0.0020  0.0015  0.0275  0.1190  -5525.5 
    (0.81)  (2.29)  (21.6)  (15.5)  (2.15)  (2.08)  (3.90)  (5.70)  0.6658
(5) MBD5  0.00010  0.0054  0.0145  -0.0117  0.0020  0.0014  0.0308  0.2115  -5482.7 
    (1.34)  (1.98)  (20.7)  (15.4)  (2.15)  (1.98)  (4.41)  (10.9)  0.6609
(6) MBD6  0.00003  0.0070  0.0148  -0.0116  0.0017  0.0013  0.0257  0.2604  -5443.6 
    (0.40)  (2.62)  (21.4)  (15.4)  (1.86)  (1.78)  (3.70)  (14.1)  0.6564
(7) MBD7  0.00008  0.0049  0.0119  -0.0102  0.0024  0.0009  0.0224  0.8790  -5004.1 
     (1.09)  (1.94)  (18.1)  (14.5)  (2.78)  (1.36)  (3.45)  (33.3)  0.6109
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Panel C. Post-Bubble period: 1990-99 
(1) MBD1  0.00048  0.0075  0.0108  -0.0098  -0.0036  -0.0011  0.0125  0.1192  -9252.7 
    (8.51)  (4.25)  (22.2)  (18.7)  (6.94)  (1.99)  (2.40)  (3.52)  0.6875
(2) MBD2  0.00043  0.0073  0.0106  -0.0097  -0.0038  -0.0013  0.0104  0.2384  -9210.1 
    (7.67)  (4.15)  (22.0)  (18.6)  (7.32)  (2.24)  (2.01)  (9.90)  0.6841
(3) MBD3  0.00038  0.0072  0.0105  -0.0096  -0.0041  -0.0013  0.0073  0.3207  -9145.4 
    (6.76)  (4.15)  (21.8)  (18.6)  (7.99)  (2.23)  (1.43)  (15.1)  0.6789
(4) MBD4  0.00050  0.0076  0.0106  -0.0097  -0.0035  -0.0011  0.0119  0.1415  -9219.1 
    (8.88)  (4.31)  (21.8)  (18.6)  (6.76)  (1.90)  (2.31)  (8.93)  0.6850
(5) MBD5  0.00055  0.0074  0.0104  -0.0097  -0.0032  -0.0010  0.0126  0.2410  -9151.6 
    (9.83)  (4.26)  (21.6)  (18.7)  (6.19)  (1.75)  (2.45)  (14.7)  0.6801
(6) MBD6  0.00045  0.0073  0.0103  -0.0096  -0.0036  -0.0013  0.0131  0.2919  -9069.4 
    (8.15)  (4.24)  (21.5)  (18.7)  (7.04)  (2.33)  (2.58)  (19.6)  0.6737
(7) MBD7  0.00053  0.0062  0.0088  -0.0086  -0.0028  -0.0014  0.0147  0.9950  -8415.9 




The results in Table 6 confirm the results shown in Tables 4 and 5. Table 6 shows that an 
increase in sales (SAL, representing size) leads to a lower concentration of loans in the 
post-bubble  period  only.  Higher  profitability  (ROA)  implies  more  banking  contacts, 
especially after 1990. Both the impact of size and profitability did not come to the fore as 
prominently as in the discrete choice models. As in Tables 4 and 5, a higher debt-to-
assets (DAR) and a lower liquidity (LAR) lead to more banking relations. With respect to 
the alternative financing forms we now find some differences between the bubble and 
post-bubble periods. It seems that both corporate bonds (CBR) and short-term loans (SLR) 
developed from complementary assets into true substitutes after 1990. For the corporate 
bond market this result coincides with the institutional observation that corporate bonds 
developed from loan-like assets into alternative market financing forms. As before having 
a main-bank relation leads to a lower concentration of loans. Especially, in the post-
bubble period an equity-holding bank relation leads to fewer banking contacts. Finally 
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5  Summary and conclusions 
 
In this paper we analyze the number of long-term bank relations that Japanese listed firms 
maintain. Japanese firms have a median of 6 long-term bank relations (while the mean is 
about 7 relations). Compared to other countries this is about the average value observed. 
But Japanese listed firms show a rather large variation around this median value. We 
present an overview of the rather extensive literature in the field of the optimal number of 
creditors. From this literature we retrieve a set of likely candidate variables that might 
have an impact on the number of bank relations. We focus on long-term loans, since these 
loans play a crucial role in the functioning of the Japanese economy. We estimate discrete 
choice models of the decision for single versus multiple relations, the decision to have a 
number of bank relations in certain classes (in a multinomial logit model) and a model 
with a continuous measurement of the loan concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl 
index).  
 
Our  general  conclusions  are  as  follows.  Size,  profitability,  solvability,  liquidity,  and 
alternative financing forms determine the number of banking contacts. These variables 
are standard determinants of the number of bank relations. Our results support especially 
the  liquidity  insurance  argument  to  have  multiple  relations,  as  well  as  the  impact  of 
solvability. We show that size and profitability matter in explaining the Herfindahl-index 
of  loan  concentration.  We  pay  special  attention  to  the  impact  of  Japanese  corporate 
governance by including indicators of the types of relations Japanese firms tend to have 
with their banks. We find on average that firms having a so-called main bank relation 
tend to have a preference for multiple loan contacts (which seems to be counterintuitive, 
but has been found before in the literature). If the bank is a relatively important equity 
owner there is a relative decrease of the desire to have multiple relations. These effects 
tend to hold for the bubble (1981-1989) ad post-bubble (1990-1999) sub-samples. R&D-
intensive firms tended to want more bank relations.  
 
The Japanese banking system has shown some drastic changes in the last few years. Bank 
concentration increased, so-called bad loans are transferred to special-purpose banks, and   30 
some bank managers have been replaced. Our paper shows that Japanese firms tend to 
have important links with multiple banks, which makes Japanese corporate behavior to be 
dependent on the developments in the banking sector. Especially for instance in R&D 
intensive  sectors  the  role  of  banks  is  big.  As  Ongena  and  Smith  (2000a)  argue,  the 
stability of the banking sector interacts with the bank-firm networking systems. Banks 
being central to Japanese development therefore have indeed an apparent leading role in 
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